海外之声|新加坡国立大学教授:美联储紧缩促使中国央行采取特殊应对措施(中英双语)

摘要: 中国人民银行牢牢控制人民币汇率的波动。

09-13 14:44 首页 IMI财经观察

观点速递

本文作者是新加坡国立大学李光耀公共政策学院的教授陈抗,原文摘自国际货币金融机构官方论坛(OMFIF)评论,OMFIF是一家总部位于伦敦的全球金融智库。

作者指出,十年前,中国经历了出口猛增和国外直接投资的大量涌入。那时,中国人民银行干预了外汇市场,通过提高商业银行的准备金率,以缓解人民币升值压力。2014年中期时,人们预计美联储加息,这让美元对所有其他货币升值。对此,中国人民银行卖出美元储备以满足外汇市场的需求,下调准备金率,避免人民币急剧贬值。

当前,对于中国人民银行来说,下调准备金率已不再是其执行冲销措施的有用工具。相反,中国人民银行综合运用多种工具为银行部门注入流动性,主要包括逆回购协议、抵押补充贷款和中期借贷便利(MLF)。2017年美国利率上升一定会促使中国采取更为特殊的应对措施。

中文译文如下:

中国应对美联储紧缩:

中国人民银行牢牢控制人民币汇率的波动

作者:陈抗

翻译:陈彦丰

审校:肖柏高

十年前,中国经历了出口猛增和国外直接投资的大量涌入。那时,中国人民银行干预了外汇市场,以缓解人民币升值压力。中国人民银行通过提高商业银行的准备金率,耗尽了流动性。在此过程中,准备金率最高达到21%,中国的外汇储备达到4万亿美元。

2014年中期时,人们预计美联储加息,因此资本开始流入美国市场。这让美元对所有其他货币升值。对此,中国人民银行的回应与之前的相反——卖出美元储备以满足外汇市场的需求,从而避免人民币急剧贬值。通过下调准备金率,以为银行释放更多资金,冲销了流动性提款的影响。

截至2016年年初,与2014年中期的顶峰值相比,中国的外汇储备减少了约8000亿美元。中国人民银行2016年3月下调准备金率的做法引起另一轮资本外逃。市场已对人民币持负面看法,中国人民银行下调准备金率被视为实行大范围货币宽松政策的信号。美联储升息促使中国人民银行采取了一系列特别的应对措施。

对于中国人民银行来说,下调准备金率已不再是其执行冲销措施的有用工具。相反,中国人民银行综合运用多种工具为银行部门注入流动性,主要包括逆回购协议、抵押补充贷款和中期借贷便利(MLF)。其中,中期借贷便利是人民银行最常使用的工具。2016年,其净注入额为2.8万亿元人民币(4050亿美元)。

银行必须为中期借贷便利提供的资金付息,意味着借款成本可以用来减少杠杆。2017年第一季度,中期借贷便利的利率上升了0.2%,表明决策者有意减少杠杆,降低金融风险。

中期借贷便利使中国人民银行能够更好地控制各银行手中的资金数量及其期限。然而,实际操作中,单方运作迫使中国人民银行延长这些便利的到期日。8月份,中国人民银行停止提供3个月的中期借贷便利,因为这些工具期限太短。自10月份以来,在期限已延长的工具中,大部分均为12个月到期。除非人民币贬值压力减小,中国人民银行继续下调准备金率,否则中国人民银行可能需要将长期借贷便利的有效期限延长至12个月以上。

中期借贷便利的另一个问题是期限错配。如果银行所持的准备金偏少,它们就无法自由地利用资金。因此,他们无法为通过中期借贷便利而筹到的资金制定长期计划。如果不知道中国人民银行何时会提供新的融资,他们甚至可能需要囤积流动资金。中小型银行的问题更加严重,它们没有从中国人民银行直接获得中期借贷便利,因此必须以更高的成本从银行间市场借款。

因此,银行更喜欢短期债务,并成为理财产品市场的活跃参与者,这些理财产品主要是证券化债券。由于新发行的政府债券大幅增加,2016年,理财市场迅速扩张。由于贷款成本低,繁荣的市场吸引了更多的融资券和公司债券。2016年,债券发行量增长47%,银行理财资产增幅超过30%。

投机性债券交易令中国人民银行猝不及防因为这是央行监管范围之外的表外活动。12月发生债券违约时,决策者收紧流动性,导致债券市场出现抛售。此外,中国人民银行宣布将理财产品纳入其对银行的宏观审慎评估。2017年美国利率上升一定会促使中国采取更为特殊的应对措施。

英文原文如下:

Fed tightens, China responds

PBoC grappling with renminbi swings

by Chen Kang in Singapore

Thu 20 Apr 2017

When China experienced an export boom and a large influx of foreign direct investment a decade ago, the People’s Bank of China intervened in the foreign exchange market to ease the appreciation of the renminbi. The PBoC exhausted liquidity by raising the reserve ratio of commercial banks. The reserve ratio peaked at 21%, and China’s foreign exchange reserves reached $4tn in the process.

In mid-2014, capital started to flow to the US market in anticipation of the Federal Reserve’s interest rate increases. As a result, the dollar began to appreciate against all other currencies. The PBoC’s response was to reverse its previous measures: the dollar reserve was drawn down to meet the demand in the foreign exchange market and avoid a sharp depreciation of the renminbi. Liquidity withdrawals were sterilised by cutting the reserve ratio to unlocked funds for banks.

By early 2016 China had lost around $800bn of its foreign exchange reserves compared to the mid-2014 peak. A cut of the reserve ratio by the PBoC in March 2016 triggered another round of capital flight. Market sentiment towards the renminbi was already negative, and the cut by the central bank was regarded as signalling broad easing. The Fed’s rate increases have triggered a chain of extraordinary PBoC responses.

Cutting the reserve ratio is no longer a useful tool for the PBoC in its sterilisation operations. Instead, a combination of instruments, mainly reverse repurchase agreements, pledged supplementary lending, and medium-term lending facilities (MLF), have been used to inject liquidity into the banking sector. The latter has been the most heavily used tool. In 2016, these facilities contributed a net injection of Rmb2.8tn ($405bn).

Banks must pay interest on MLF funds, which means borrowing costs can be used to reduce leverage. In the first quarter of 2017, MLF rates were increased by 0.2%, indicating policy-makers’ intention to reduce leverage and lower financial risk.

MLF gives the PBoC more control over the amount of funds that banks hold and their duration. In practice, however, the one-sided operation forces the central bank to extend the facilities at ever longer maturities. The PBoC stopped offering three-month MLF in August because these facilities matured too soon. Of those facilities extended since October, most have 12-month maturities. Unless the pressure on renminbi depreciation eases and the central bank continues to cut the reserve ratio, the PBoC may need to extend long-term lending facilities at maturities greater than 12 months.

Another problem with MLF is maturity mismatch. Banks cannot use the funds as freely as they would if they could hold lower reserves. As a result, they are unable to prepare long-term plans for funds raised from MLF operations. They may even need to hoard liquidity if they don’t know when the PBoC will extend new financing. The problem is exacerbated for small and medium-sized banks, which do not get MLF funds directly from the PBoC and must rely on borrowing from the interbank market at higher costs.

Banks therefore prefer short-term debts and have become active participants in the market of wealth management products, mostly securitised bonds. The market saw a rapid expansion in 2016, facilitated by a significant increase in new issuance of government-related bonds. The upbeat market attracted more issuance of financing bills and corporate bonds, owing to low borrowing costs. In 2016, bond issuance grew by 47%, and wealth management assets of banks increased by more than 30%.

The speculative bond trading took the PBoC by surprise, as these were off-balance-sheet activities outside its realm of surveillance. When several bond defaults occurred in December, policy-makers tightened liquidity, which led to a sell-off in the bond market. In addition, the PBoC announced that it would include wealth management products in its macro prudential assessment of banks. Additional US rate increases in 2017 are sure to incite yet more extraordinary measures in China.

Chen Kang is Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.

观点整理  张晨希

图文编辑  张晨希


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